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Abstract: This paper rst extends the theory of almost stochastic dominance (ASD) to the rst
four orders. We then establish some equivalent relationships for the rst four orders of the ASD.
Using these results, we prove formally that the ASD denition modied by Tzeng et al. (2012) does
not possess any hierarchy property. Thereafter, we conclude that when the rst four orders of ASD
are used in the prospects comparison, risk-averse investors prefer the one with positive gain, smaller
variance, positive skewness, and smaller kurtosis. This information, in turn, enables decision makers
to determine the ASD relationship among prospects when they know the moments of the prospects.
At last, we discuss the necessary and sucient conditions for dierent orders the ASD and the
moments of the prospects.
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1 Introduction
Stochastic dominance (SD) theory has been well established, see, for example, Hanoch and
Levy (1969), Hadar and Russell (1969), and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). Leshno and
Levy (2002) extend it to the theory of almost stochastic dominance (ASD) for most decision
makers. Tzeng et al. (2012) show that the almost second-degree ASD (ASD2) introduced
by Leshno and Levy (2002) does not possess the property of expected-utility maximization.
They modify the ASD2 denition to acquire this property. Nonetheless, Guo, et al. (2013)
have constructed some examples to show that the ASD denition modied by Tzeng et al.
(2012) does not possess any hierarchy property.
In this paper, we rst extend the theory of ASD to the rst four orders. We then de-
velop some equivalent properties for dierent orders of ASD. Using these results, we prove
formally that the ASD denition modied by Tzeng et al. (2012) does not possess any hier-
archy property. Thereafter, we establish the relationships between dierent orders of ASDs
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and the moments of the prospects being compared. These ndings lead us conclude that
when the rst four orders of ASD are used in the prospect comparison, risk-averse decision
makers prefer the one with positive gain, smaller variance, positive skewness, and smaller
kurtosis. This information, in turn, enables academics and practitioners to determine the
ASD relationship among prospects when they know the moments of the prospects. At last,
we discuss the necessary and sucient conditions for the ASD and the moments of the
prospects.
2 Notations and Denitions
In order to develop some relationships for the ASD concepts proposed by Leshno and Levy
(2002) and modied by Tzeng et al. (2012), we rst state the denitions and notations
being used in this paper. Suppose that random variables X and Y dened on the support

 = [a; b] with means X and Y and standard deviations X and Y have the corre-
sponding distribution functions F and G, respectively. The following notations will be used
throughout this paper:
H(1) = H and H(n)(x) =
Z x
a
H(n 1)(t)dt for H = F;G and n = 2; 3; 4 ;
F (n)  G(n) = Z b
a
F (n)(x) G(n)(x)dx ; and (1)
Sn  Sn(F;G) =

x 2 [a; b] : G(n)(x) < F (n)(x)	 for n = 1;    ; 4 :
An individual chooses between X and Y with distribution functions F and G, re-
spectively, in accordance with a consistent set of preferences satisfying the von Neumann-
Morgenstern (1944) consistency properties. Accordingly, X is preferred to Y if E[u(X)] 
E[u(Y )]  0 in which E[u(X)]  R ba u(x)dF (x) and E[u(Y )]  R ba u(x)dG(x). We rst
rewrite the denition of ASD introduced by Leshno and Levy (2002) and modied by
Tzeng et al. (2012) and extend it to the rst four orders as follows:
Denition 1 Let F and G be the corresponding distribution functions of X and Y . For
0 <  < 1=2,
-ASD1: X is said to dominate Y by -ASD1, denoted by X almost()1 Y , if and only ifZ
S1

F (x) G(x)dx  F  G;
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-ASD2: X is said to dominate Y by -ASD2, denoted by X almost()2 Y , if and only ifZ
S2

F (2)(x) G(2)(x)dx  F (2)  G(2) and X  Y ;
-ASD3: X is said to dominate Y by -ASD3, denoted by X almost()3 Y , if and only ifZ
S3

F (3)(x) G(3)(x)dx  F (3)  G(3) and G(n)(b)  F (n)(b) for n = 2; 3 :
-ASD4: X is said to dominate Y by -ASD4, denoted by X almost()4 Y , if and only ifZ
S4

F (4)(x) G(4)(x)dx  F (4)  G(4) and G(n)(b)  F (n)(b) for n = 2; 3; 4 ;
where -ASDn is the n-order ASD for n = 1;    ; 4.
In addition, we dene the following utility functions:
Denition 2 For n = 1;    ; 4,
Un =

u : ( 1)iu(i)  0 ; i = 1;    ; n	 ;
Un() =

u 2 Un : ( 1)n+1u(n)(x)  inff( 1)n+1u(n)(x)g[1=  1] 8x
	
;
in which  is in the range of (0; 1=2).1
We call investors the n-order risk averters if their utility functions u 2 Un and the n-order
-risk averters if their utility functions u 2 Un(). Without loss of generality, we call them
risk averters or risk-averse investors.
3 The Theory
We rst rewrite the main results in Tzeng et al. (2012) and extend it to the rst four orders
that ASD possesses the utility maximization property as stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 1 Let F and G be the corresponding distribution functions of X and Y and u
is an utility function. For n = 1;    ; 4,
X almost()n Y if and only if E[u(X)] > E[u(Y )] for any u 2 Un().
1We note that the theory can be extended to satisfy utilities dened to be non-dierentiable and/or
non-expected utility functions, readers may refer to Wong and Ma (2008) and the references therein for
more information.
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Since it is very dicult, if not impossible, to make comparison for utility maximization
of any pair of prospects, say, X and Y , based on the results from Theorem 1 academics and
practitioners could turn to compare the -ASD ranking of the prospects which could then
be able to draw the utility maximization preference of the prospects for investors in Un().
In this paper we establish some equivalent conditions for dierent orders of ASD. We
rst present the following theorem for the rst-order ASD:
Theorem 2 For any pair of random variables X and Y dened on [a; b] with means
X and Y and distribution functions F and G, respectively, the following statements are
equivalent:
a. X dominates Y by -ASD1,
b. X > Y , and
c. G(2)(b) > F (2)(b).
We then present the following theorem for the second-order ASD:
Theorem 3 For any pair of random variables X and Y stated in Theorem 2, the follow-
ing statements are equivalent:
a. X dominates Y by -ASD2,
b. X  Y and 2b(X   Y ) > E(X2) E(Y 2), and
c. G(3)(b) > F (3)(b) and G(2)(b)  F (2)(b).
Thereafter, we establish the following theorem for the third-order ASD:
Theorem 4 For any pair of random variables X and Y stated in Theorem 2, the following
statements are equivalent:
a. X dominates Y by -ASD3,
b. X  Y , 2b(X Y )  E(X2) E(Y 2), and E(X3) E(Y 3) > 3b(E(X2) E(Y 2)) 
3b2(X   Y ), and
c. G(4)(b) > F (4)(b) and G(n)(b)  F (n)(b) for n = 2; 3.
Finally, we establish the following theorem for the fourth-order ASD:
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Theorem 5 For any pair of random variables X and Y stated in Theorem 2, the following
statements are equivalent:
a. X dominates Y by -ASD4,
b. X  Y , 2b(X   Y )  E(X2)  E(Y 2), E(X3)  E(Y 3)  3b(E(X2)  E(Y 2)) 
3b2(X   Y ) and 4b3
 
X   Y
  12b2G(3)(b)  F (3)(b)+ 24bG(4)(b)  F (4)(b) >
(E(X4) E(Y 4)) with 2G(3)(b) F (3)(b) = 2b X Y  E(X2) E(Y 2); 6G(4)(b) 
F (4)(b)

= E(X3)  E(Y 3)  3b(E(X2)  E(Y 2)) + 3b2(X   Y ), and
c. G(5)(b) > F (5)(b) and G(n)(b)  F (n)(b) for n = 2; 3; 4.
Guo, et al. (2013) have constructed some examples to show that the ASD denition
modied by Tzeng et al. (2012) does not possess any hierarchy property. In this paper,
we prove this property formally by using the results of Theorems 2 to 5 as shown in the
following theorem:
Theorem 6 The almost stochastic dominance dened in Denition 1 does not possess
any hierarchy property.
In addition, the results from Theorems 2 to 5 could be used to determine the relationships
between dierent orders of the ASD and the moments of the prospects. We rst state the
relationship between the rst-order ASD and the rst moments of the prospects as shown
in the following corollary:
Corollary 7 For any pair of random variables X and Y with means X and Y , respec-
tively, X 6= Y if and only if there is a rst-order ASD relationship between X and Y . In
particular, X almost()1 Y () X > Y .
From Corollary 7, it is clear that if the means of the prospects are dierent, even it is
very small, one will prefer the one with larger mean by using -ASD1. It is well known that
SD possesses the hierarchy property such that the rst-order SD implies the second-order
SD which, in turn, implies the third-order SD, and so on, and thus, practitioners could
stop for any higher-order SD investigation when they nd any lower-order SD relationship
between the prospects. It will be good if the ASD could possess the hierarchy property.
However, in this paper we formally prove in Theorem 6 that the ASD denition modied by
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Tzeng et al. (2012) does not possess any hierarchy property. Nonetheless, in this paper, we
still recommend practitioners investigate higher-order ASD only when they do not nd any
lower-order ASD. Since Corollary 7 tells that there is rst-order ASD relationship between
two prospects if their means are dierent, we will examine whether there is any second-
order ASD relationship between the prospects only when their means are the same. Under
this condition and using the result in Theorem 3, we establish the following corollary to
determine the relationship between the second-order ASD and the second moments of the
prospects:
Corollary 8 For any pair of random variables X and Y with means X and Y , respec-
tively, if X = Y , then
X almost()2 Y () var(X) < var(Y ).
It is well known (Levy, 1998) that in the traditional SD theory, for any pair of prospects
X and Y , if X = Y , then var(X) < var(Y ) is only a necessary condition but not a
sucient condition for the second order SD of X over Y . Nevertheless, the result from
Corollary 8 implies that for -ASD2, under the condition of X = Y , the inequality
var(X) < var(Y ) is not only the necessary condition but also the sucient condition for
the dominance of X over Y in the sense of -ASD2.
We further investigate the comparison of prospects X and Y by the third-order ASD.
Similarly, though ASD does not possess any hierarchy property, we still recommend to
examine whether there is any third-order ASD only when one does not nd any rst two
orders of ASD between prospects X and Y . Thus, we will compare the preference of
prospects X and Y in the sense of the third-order ASD only under the situation in which
X = Y and var(X) = var(Y ). In this situation, both -ASD1 and -ASD2 fail to
distinguish which prospect is better and we can use -ASD3 to draw preference between
two prospects. From Theorem 4, we conclude that the one with larger third moment is
preferred even the dierence is very small. Formally, we establish the following corollary:
Corollary 9 For any pair of random variables X and Y , if X = Y and var(X) =
var(Y ), then
X almost()3 Y () E[(X   X)3] > E[(Y   Y )3].
Similarly, we discuss the the fourth-order ASD when the rst three moments are equal.
The following corollary leads us to conclude that in this situation, the prospect with smaller
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kurtosis is preferred.
Corollary 10 For any pair of random variables X and Y , if X = Y , var(X) = var(Y )
and E[(X   X)3] = E[(Y   Y )3], then
X almost()4 Y () E[(X   X)4] < E[(Y   Y )4].
The above four corollaries imply that when -ASDn are used in the prospects comparison
for n = 1;    ; 4, risk-averse investors prefer the one with positive gain, smaller variance,
positive skewness, and smaller kurtosis. We note that there are some studies draw a similar
conclusion for the rst three orders. For example, Post and Levy (2005) suggest that a
third-order polynomial utility function implies that investors care only about the rst three
central moments of the return distribution (mean, variance, and skewness). Post and Versijp
(2007) suggest that third-order stochastic dominance (TSD) eciency applies if and only if
a portfolio is optimal for some nonsatiable, risk-averse, and skewness-loving investor.
4 Concluding Remarks and Discussions
In this paper we extend the theory of ASD to the rst four orders and develop some
equivalent relationships of the rst four orders of ASD. Using these results, we rst prove
formally that the ASD denition modied by Tzeng et al. (2012) does not possess any
hierarchy property. Thereafter, we conclude that when -ASDn are used in the prospect
comparison for n = 1;    ; 4, risk-averse investors prefer the one with higher mean, smaller
variance, higher skewness, and smaller kurtosis.2 This information enables academics and
practitioners to determine the ASD relationship among prospects when they know the
moments of the prospects. This information, in turn, enables investors to make wiser
decision in their investment.
We note that the preference of higher mean, smaller variance, higher skewness, and
smaller kurtosis is not only a necessary condition but also a sucient condition for the
ASD if ASD has hierarchy property. However, it is well known that ASD does not possess
any hierarchy property, and thus, the preference of higher mean, smaller variance, higher
skewness, and smaller kurtosis is only a necessary condition but not a sucient condition
2We note that one could easily extend our work to n > 4. However, though some studies, see, for example,
Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006), Eeckhoudt, et al. (2009), and Denuit and Eeckhoudt (2010), study risk
to n > 4, most academics and practitioners are only interested in studying the case up to n = 4. Thus, we
stop at n = 4.
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for the ASD. Nonetheless, if one only considers investors in U1 (), U
0
2 () = U

2 () \ U1 (),
U03 () = U3 () \ U
0
2 (), and U
0
4 () = U

4 () \ U
0
3 (), then the preference of higher mean,
smaller variance, higher skewness, and smaller kurtosis is not only a necessary condition
but also a sucient condition for the ASD.
At last, academics and practitioners may not like to see the results in which if the means
(variances, skewness, kurtosis) of the prospects are bigger (smaller, bigger, smaller), even
it is very small, one will prefer the one with larger mean (smaller variance, larger skewness,
smaller kurtosis) by using the -ASD rule. One may wish to nd a way to overcome this
\limitation." The answer is very simple - to choose  to be signicantly smaller than 1=2.
Actually, Levy, et al. (2010) have provided a good solution. They suggest two approaches.
We modify their suggestion as follows:
The rst approach is to check the actual area violation  in Denition 1 that is (signi-
cantly) smaller than 1=2. The second approach is to nd for a given group of subjects what
is the allowed area violation by each investor and whether for all subjects belonging to this
group the allowed area violation is greater than the actual area violation.
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